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## THE POLITICS BEHIND BRADDOCK'S EXPEDITION

THE operations of Washington on the Monongahela ending in his capitulation at Great Meadows, July, 1754, convinced at least one party in English politics that the Newcastle administration either could not or would not settle so delicate a matter as the colonial situation by diplomacy. To understand the politics which lay behind the important question of sending regular troops to the support of the colonists, it will be necessary to trace briefly the rise of the Cumberland opposition to the Duke of Newcastle—an opposition which was both personal and political, and which came in time to represent a distinct difference in policy.

The origin of this opposition lay in the years immediately subsequent to the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, while Pelham was still First Lord of the Treasury, and none but Whigs guided the policies of the government. The Duke of Cumberland, the hero of Culloden, was not a member of the cabinet, but as commander-in-chief of the forces, he possessed considerable influence, as well as a large circle of personal friends,<sup>1</sup> including Lord Sandwich, the Duke of Bedford, and Henry Fox, the Secretary at War. During the peace negotiations of 1748 Newcastle, who was Secretary of State, had fallen out with Sandwich, England's representative at Aix-la-Chapelle.<sup>2</sup> Cumberland, who, unlike Fox,<sup>3</sup> had supported the duke in his recent war policy,<sup>4</sup> was desirous of promoting a reconciliation; but the duke proved not only obstinate but discourteous,<sup>5</sup> and, as Fox expressed it, "a breach ensued".<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The social and political rendezvous was Windsor Lodge, where the duke lived with his unmarried sister, the Princess Amelia.

<sup>2</sup> The quarrel, broadly speaking, had been the result of a split in the cabinet on the question of whether or not the peace should be concluded without waiting for Austria's participation. Sandwich, annoyed by contradictory orders from Newcastle, deferred the execution of his final instructions, basing his conduct upon the knowledge that a majority of the cabinet was for peace, almost at any cost. On receiving a letter of censure from the duke, he answered by an apology; but cool relations continued between them. Coxe, *Pelham Administration*, II. 1-4; *Bedford Papers*, I. 584.

<sup>3</sup> Diary of Lord Marchmont, *Marchmont Papers* (ed. Rose), I. 231.

<sup>4</sup> As against the Peace Party in the cabinet led by Pelham. The general quarrel on the subject of peace or war had been directly responsible for the retirement, in succession, of Harrington and Chesterfield from the co-ordinate secretaryship of State.

<sup>5</sup> He seems to have written a discourteous letter to the Princess Amelia, and followed it by further affronts. Coxe, *Pelham Administration*, II. 110.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

Meanwhile serious disagreement arose between Newcastle and Bedford, the co-ordinate Secretary of State.<sup>7</sup> The latter had a grudge of his own against Newcastle by reason of an affront which he had received while First Lord of the Admiralty. Bedford had worked out a most elaborate scheme for expelling the French from the districts bordering on the St. Lawrence.<sup>8</sup> Preparations were actually begun for the expedition; but no encouragement could be enlisted from the powerful members of the cabinet, and despite the appeals of Bedford, the project was suffered to collapse.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps to conciliate the disappointed duke, it was decided to invite him to the office of Secretary of State, the supposition being that he would be content with the compliment and decline in favor of Sandwich, then a devotee of Newcastle's. But Bedford fooled his enemy and took the office himself.<sup>10</sup> This was in June, 1748.

For three years Newcastle and Bedford quarrelled almost ceaselessly. The senior secretary was jealous of his colleague's intimacy with Cumberland<sup>11</sup> and indignant that he was not always consulted in the business of Bedford's department. Yet Pelham was unwilling to consent to his dismissal<sup>12</sup> until Bedford made the mistake of opposing the administration in Parliament.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile Fox coquetted with both parties, until his attack upon the Regency-Bill,<sup>14</sup> which Cumberland regarded as a personal slight,<sup>15</sup> awoke Pelham to the danger of the situation; and in June, 1751, both Bedford and Sandwich were forced to retire.

From the retirement of Bedford the leadership of the Cumberland faction<sup>16</sup> devolved upon Fox; and the period from this time until the death of Pelham in March, 1754, is marked by his steady

<sup>7</sup> A crisis was with difficulty averted in the spring of 1749. Walpole's *Correspondence* (ed. Toynbee), II. 365.

<sup>8</sup> *Bedford Papers*, I. 65-69.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 199-200.

<sup>10</sup> Coxe, *Pelham Administration*, I. 390-391.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 356.

<sup>12</sup> The correspondence of these years are full of complaints against Bedford and plans for his dismissal.

<sup>13</sup> On the Bill for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants. Fox opposed it for a time, but changed his tactics later. Walpole, *Memoirs of George II.*, I. 47-48, 53.

<sup>14</sup> Fox gained the approval of the king afterward, whose affection for the duke was the chief cause of the Secretary at War's favor in the Closet.

<sup>15</sup> He told Fox that it "marked him a bad man to posterity". Fox to Williams, December 15, 1751. Hanbury Papers in the Coxe Collection, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 9191.

<sup>16</sup> Notable among the members of the faction, besides Fox, Bedford and Sandwich, were Lord Gower, Sir Hanbury Williams, the Duke of Marlborough, and later the Duke of Devonshire and his son, the Marquis of Hartington.

rise in prominence.<sup>17</sup> Generally he remained loyal to Pelham, for he was too ambitious to become the latter's successor to follow Bedford into open opposition; yet his conduct was frequently a cause of anxiety,<sup>18</sup> and his violent assaults<sup>19</sup> upon the Hardwicke Marriage Act incurred the undying hatred of the Chancellor. Thus when Fox seemed on the point of winning the post left vacant by Pelham's death, the clever intriguing of Hardwicke<sup>20</sup> secured it for his friend, the Duke of Newcastle.

Having thwarted a man so prominent as Fox, the new First Lord felt compelled to offer him the secretaryship of State, but he failed to measure correctly the character of his opponent, and when the duke broke his word respecting the terms of the bargain,<sup>21</sup> Fox declined to impair his political value by unworthy subservience to a man he despised. Sir Thomas Robinson was then made Secretary of State and the ministry was reconstructed with a view of making Newcastle's power absolute in the cabinet. During the next month the duke was chiefly occupied with the election of a new Parliament, and neither at home nor abroad were dangers as yet manifest.

But neither Fox nor Pitt,<sup>22</sup> the Paymaster-General, was willing to forget his disappointments, and the Cumberland faction was tireless in its intrigues during the summer of 1754.<sup>23</sup> In August Cumberland gained the assistance of Pitt (through Fox's agency) in solving a relief for out-pensioners,<sup>24</sup> and the paymaster's interest in

<sup>17</sup> As clearly shown, for example, by Lord Hillsborough's conversation with Doddington. *Diary of Lord Melcombe*, November 27, 1752. "It is prodigious", said Hillsborough, "how many friends Fox has."

<sup>18</sup> See for example: *Diary of Lord Melcombe*, October 4, 1752, and March 7, 1754; Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> Actuated chiefly by hatred of the Chancellor. It was scarcely a stroke of faction, although Hardwicke so regarded it.

<sup>20</sup> Interestingly shown in his letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Harris, *Life of Hardwicke*, II. 511-515.

<sup>21</sup> Fox was to have had the management of the Commons, a disposal of some of the offices, and full intelligence regarding the expenditure of secret-service money. Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754. MSS. of G. W. Digby, *Report of Royal Commission on Hist. MSS.*, VIII.

<sup>22</sup> Pitt had likewise been a candidate to succeed Pelham.

<sup>23</sup> Legge, Fox, and the Duke of Devonshire seem to have been chiefly concerned, but Fox was the centre of them. The letters in the Newcastle and Hardwicke collections (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32735, 32736, 35414) during that season are full of plots and intrigues, exaggerated often, no doubt, by the duke's imagination. The most important fact to be noted in this connection was Devonshire's suggestion that Fox should be admitted to the cabinet (*ibid.*, 35414, f. 173); but just what was Fox's object is difficult to decide. We know that he half regretted his dignified attitude in March (when Newcastle broke his word), and it is possible that he was aiming for a cabinet seat plus the management of the Commons, with or without limitations.

<sup>24</sup> *Chatham Correspondence*, I. 110-111.

colonial affairs served to strengthen the alliance. In his management of the War Office Fox was energetic and painstaking. If he humored Newcastle's habit of overseeing all departments, he was nevertheless insistent upon resenting any unwarrantable encroachment; and a recent quarrel with Secretary Holdernessee over War Office business had resulted in a victory for Fox in the Closet.<sup>25</sup> It was only too evident where lay the danger to Newcastle's political power.

Such was the situation in politics when the news of Washington's capitulation forced the cabinet to embark upon a departure in policy. Neglect of the colonies by the home government had long been notorious; and little or nothing had been done in the way of settling the endless disputes<sup>26</sup> or preparing for a possible enforcement of British pretensions. Almost the only one, since Bedford's fall,<sup>27</sup> who realized the importance of the colonial problem, was the somewhat impetuous Lord Halifax, President of the Board of Trade; and it was probably at his instigation that a cabinet meeting had been finally called on June 13. The efforts of Governor Shirley to resist French encroachments on the Kennebec<sup>28</sup> were there discussed, and it was decided to send immediate directions for promoting a general plan of concert between the colonies.<sup>29</sup> Such a scheme had already been set on foot, resulting in the abortive Congress of Albany, and though the Board of Trade drafted a new plan in August,<sup>30</sup> nothing effectual resulted.

Of the cabinet meeting, which first discussed the proposal of sending strength to the colonies,<sup>31</sup> no evidence has, unfortunately,

<sup>25</sup> Fox claimed that he had not been consulted with regard to some army orders sent to the West Indies, and carried his complaint to the king, who supported his case. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, ff. 336, 395.

<sup>26</sup> Chief reliance was placed in a boundary commission, which resulted in a deadlock.

<sup>27</sup> Bancroft (ed. 1884), II. 368, remarks, "No energetic system of colonial administration could be adopted without the aid of the friends of Bedford." Bedford's schemes for colonizing Nova Scotia are shown in a letter to Cumberland in *Bedford Papers*, I. 572-573.

<sup>28</sup> Shirley had written Secretary Holdernessee on the subject of his fears, but they do not seem to have been justified by his own investigations later. Palfrey, *History of New England*, V. 128.

<sup>29</sup> Members of the cabinet present: Granville, Hardwicke, Newcastle, Anson, and Secretaries Holdernessee and Robinson. Lord Halifax also attended the meeting. Minute, Newcastle House. Newcastle Papers, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32995, f. 266.

<sup>30</sup> *New York Colonial Documents* (ed. O'Callaghan), VI. 903-906.

<sup>31</sup> Orders were issued September 30 for the regiments to be embarked at Cork (Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, II. 268). We may therefore presume that the meeting took place some time late in September. On the 29th Fox refers

come down to us. The problem was by no means a simple one; for the sending of an expedition by the home government would imply an official recognition of a struggle which was war in all but name. Nominally, of course, the measure would be for defensive purposes solely, but whether France would so regard it was at best a debatable question, and the diplomatic chaos surrounding England's relations with the great powers<sup>32</sup> enforced upon Newcastle a realization of the risk which such a step would entail.

It was perhaps inevitable that the prominent figures interested in the question should disagree on many points. Granville, the Lord President, had long felt that the colonists were strong enough without re-enforcement from England.<sup>33</sup> Newcastle doubted the truth of this,<sup>34</sup> but being in his infancy as a financier, he dreaded to consider anything which might entail great expenditure; and Hardwicke, while he acknowledged that the check on the Ohio had shown the helplessness of the colonists, was even more anxious than Newcastle on the subject of the expense, and warned him specifically against too extensive a campaign.<sup>35</sup> Granville's suggestion of putting the colonists in a position to help themselves—a policy which required the sending of officers, clothing, and money in plenty—was certain to demand more of Parliament than Newcastle had as yet dared to contemplate.<sup>36</sup>

But it soon became evident that the Duke of Cumberland would be the determining factor in the question; and that he and his following were resolved upon a vigorous policy. Late in September—probably as a result of a cabinet meeting—preparations were commenced for despatching two regiments on the Irish establishment, each to number 500 men, with 200 additional to be supplied by the colonists. Since, moreover, the two regiments in question were not up to their full quota of men, it was decided to draft a sufficient number from other regiments to replenish the ranks.<sup>37</sup>

to the raising of the colonial regiments in a letter to Newcastle (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, f. 603), and on the 21st the calling of a prospective meeting is mentioned (*ibid.*, f. 554).

<sup>32</sup> On both Austria and Holland the English hold was precarious. Mr. Corbett (*England in the Seven Years War*, I. 23) gives an able summary of the diplomatic situation and its chief dangers. In event of a rupture with France, it was important that England should not appear the aggressor.

<sup>33</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 4, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, f. 428.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 436, 583.

<sup>36</sup> Torrens, *History of British Cabinets*, II. 192. On the other hand Newcastle was mortally afraid that his enemies would make party capital from the reverses on the Ohio (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, f. 554). It was probably this fear which enjoined upon him the necessity of taking some active step.

<sup>37</sup> Winthrop Sargent, *History of Braddock's Expedition*, p. 134.

To this extent the cabinet was no doubt unanimous;<sup>38</sup> but it was further determined that two additional regiments should be raised in the colonies and commanded by Shirley<sup>39</sup> and Pepperrell for service in another part of the country, *the expense being borne by the king*.<sup>40</sup> This was in accordance with Granville's idea<sup>41</sup> and must have been accepted with considerable reluctance by the First Lord of the Treasury. Meanwhile the chief command of the two Irish regiments was given to General Edward Braddock, a friend and nominee of the Duke of Cumberland.<sup>42</sup>

But the question now arose—should the Shirley-Pepperrell contingent be fitted out at the same time as that of Braddock, or should preparations be postponed until some future time? Newcastle was strongly in favor of separating the two expeditions;<sup>43</sup> and Hardwicke as usual concurred, believing—besides his tendency to procrastination—that the English ambassador at Paris would have his hands full enough, explaining away Braddock's expedition to France's satisfaction, let alone any further demonstrations.<sup>44</sup>

Cumberland was, however, of a different mind. Besides detesting the First Lord personally, he despised his methods and his policy; and both he and his friend Fox were determined to push the two expeditions simultaneously.<sup>45</sup> On October 6 Fox sent Newcastle a full list of the requirements of the War Office,<sup>46</sup> and a similar notification appeared in the *Gazette* of that date. On the following day the energetic secretary appeared before the king and secured the royal signature to all orders he had framed, including warrants to raise the two colonial regiments as well as the appointment of a selected list of officers to be despatched for duty under Shirley's command.<sup>47</sup> The same day the Board of Ordnance held

<sup>38</sup> See above, note 36.

<sup>39</sup> Gov. Shirley to take the chief command.

<sup>40</sup> Sargent, p. 132.

<sup>41</sup> It seems to have been Granville, rather than Halifax (as Mr. Sargent assumes, p. 129), who chiefly advocated the policy of equipping the colonists rather than that of sending regular troops from England. Cumberland, who had no confidence in any but regular troops (Walpole, *Memoirs*, I. 390), was the champion of the alternative policy.

<sup>42</sup> Sargent, p. 131.

<sup>43</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 107. The duke was also worried by the proposed plan of an expedition against Crown Point.

<sup>44</sup> "Depend upon it", he writes, in opposing the idea of an extensive campaign, "there will be a good deal of difference . . . both in point of expense, and in respect of general consequences." Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 27, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, f. 583.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 32737, f. 107.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 51.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 63. Fox was evidently acting without authorization from the cabinet, as will shortly appear.

a meeting to consider expense, and perhaps to allay the parsimonious fears of the First Lord, Fox told the Secretary of the Treasury that everything in his office had been "considered in the most economical manner".<sup>48</sup>

Secretary Robinson was not a little disturbed by all this haste, and whereas he dared not obstruct Cumberland on his own initiative, he took the precaution of sending a special messenger to Newcastle with the news that the king had signed the warrants and that the Board of Ordnance would advertise for ships on the morrow.<sup>49</sup>

The perplexity of Newcastle can well be imagined. He had already found that Pitt and Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty, favored the more expensive and recently adopted schemes of Granville;<sup>50</sup> and it now appeared that Cumberland and Fox were going further. Politically his danger was more acute than appeared on the surface.<sup>51</sup> It was only recently that Hardwicke had expressed his fear that Fox's intrigues would force them to make him sole leader of the Commons,<sup>52</sup> and "when that is attained", wrote the Chancellor to his friend, "there will be in my apprehension an end of your Grace's chief power as minister of this country."<sup>53</sup> Nor was Fox the only one of the faction involved in these intrigues. It was well known that the Duke of Marlborough was aiming to supplant Dorset<sup>54</sup> as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, that an effort was being made to restore Bedford to office, and that Legge, the ever-provoking Chancellor of the Exchequer, was both working in Fox's interest and seeking a pension for the Earl of Sandwich.<sup>55</sup> Pitt's

<sup>48</sup> West to Newcastle, October 7, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 73.

<sup>49</sup> Robinson to Newcastle, October 7, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 61. The Chancellor later pointed to this advertisement for transports as the limit, in the matter of publicity, which should have been allowed. *Ibid.*, f. 147.

<sup>50</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 2, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 24. Pitt was not, of course, a member of the cabinet, but was sometimes consulted by the duke. He was in favor of both plans (the raising of colonial regiments and the sending of regular troops from England). It is interesting to note that he had also suggested the raising of Highlanders for service in America—a proposal which Cumberland rejected through fear of Jacobitism.

<sup>51</sup> Walpole gives an example of the duke's fear and jealousy of Cumberland. *Memoirs*, I. 382.

<sup>52</sup> This was the ostensible object of Legge's persistent intrigues. The creation of a minister in the Commons directly responsible to the king ("Legge's old idea", as it came to be called) is constantly discussed in the correspondence of this year. Naturally Newcastle preferred to have the management in the hands of Robinson, who would be duly subservient; but whom Fox and Legge were justified in believing incompetent. "Legge's idea" was destined, as we know, to become the basis of Pitt's political creed and that of his son.

<sup>53</sup> Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, f. 583.

<sup>54</sup> The Duke of Dorset had already proved his incompetence in the governing of Ireland.

<sup>55</sup> Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32736, ff. 583, 592.



hostility was not even veiled;<sup>56</sup> and the martial policy of Cumberland served to focus all the elements of resistance.

Meanwhile Fox was tireless in the pursuit of his programme. If his friend Bedford had felt the mortification of seeing an unvetoed project fade into oblivion in the office of a colleague, Fox determined that no office under his direction should wait for the beck and call of the shifty Newcastle. Not being a member of the cabinet, he was probably obliged to depend upon Granville to represent him there, but there was possibly some advantage to be derived from that very lack of participation in its transactions. For the present, the idea that Deputy-Commissary Pitcher should have his departure delayed for a quartermaster-general whose whereabouts was unknown,<sup>57</sup> evidently struck him as wholly unnecessary, and on October 8 he published an order in the *Gazette* that "the officers appointed to command the regiments to be raised in America should repair forthwith to their posts".<sup>58</sup>

For Newcastle and Hardwicke the climax was now reached. The Chancellor indignantly complained that such an act was contrary to the secrecy agreed upon by the cabinet, and regarded it as a "fresh proof how fond some persons were of power and what use they would make of it if they were in".<sup>59</sup> At the same time the news of a three-hour conference between Fox and Pitt worried both the duke and his friend with a consciousness of their minority.<sup>60</sup> When the paymaster had given his support to Granville's colonial policy, the Chancellor had expressed the hope that at least he would support it in Parliament<sup>61</sup> (the centre always of Newcastle's fears), and he now perceived that Pitt was determined to keep firmly on the side of Cumberland.<sup>62</sup>

Newcastle, in the meantime, saw that there was but one way of

<sup>56</sup> It was probably about this time that Pitt gave Newcastle the well-known rebuff with its stinging sarcasm: "Your Grace knows that I have no capacity for these things and therefore I do not desire to be informed about them (colonial affairs)." *Diary of Lord Melcombe*, October 8, 1754.

<sup>57</sup> It was supposed that Lieut.-Col. St. Clair was somewhere in Flanders, but it was not known with certainty. Anson believed it would be nearly a fortnight before he could present himself for duty. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 105. Fox intended that Pitcher should sail on the 14th, and supposed, probably, that he could force the appointment of another quartermaster. *Ibid.*, f. 63.

<sup>58</sup> *London Gazette*, October 8, 1754, quoted by Torrens, who gives a rather disconnected account of this controversy, II. 197-198.

<sup>59</sup> Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 147.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 109, 147. "I suppose in time", Hardwicke remarked dryly, "fire and water may agree."

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 27.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 147.

checking his enemies and that was to lay his case before the king. It was true that George the Second had long bestowed his favor upon Fox,<sup>63</sup> but he was a man, who, while governable through a judicious use of tact, was ever sensitive to the least sign of coercion, and it was in this fact that the duke could place his hopes. So on the same day on which Fox had blown his latest blast the duke hurried to the royal Closet and prevailed upon the king to suspend all orders until a meeting should be held and they "had talked things over with Mr. Secretary at War. The King told me", continued Newcastle in relating the episode afterward, "that he was surprised when Fox brought the orders to sign for raising Shirley's and Pepperrell's regiments *now*. 'But', says the King, '*Mr. Fox told me it was to be so and what could I do?*' I did not presume to say 'Not sign them'; but was very happy to have procured his Majesty's orders that everything should be suspended; which accordingly was done."<sup>64</sup>

For the moment Newcastle had triumphed, and it is possible that the duke's feelings are reflected in a cabinet meeting which took place the following day. Fox, though not of the cabinet, was present at the conference, and it was probably his proposal that the two regiments of Braddock should be augmented. At all events a majority of the cabinet decided in the negative.<sup>65</sup> It would appear also that the secretary's recent haste had been too much for Anson, since the latter made a special effort to restrain him from dabbling in West Indian affairs, and it was insisted that Mr. Pitcher should wait for the missing quartermaster-general. The most Fox could do was to put off a second meeting of the cabinet until he should have consulted the Duke of Cumberland.<sup>66</sup> In connection with the meeting of October 9, we simply know that he was "civil", and

<sup>63</sup> This was one of Newcastle's chief anxieties, as shown by his correspondence of this year.

<sup>64</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 107.

<sup>65</sup> It was also decided to send two representatives to the Indians (one to the northern tribes, the other to the southern) in order to solicit their participation in the prospective expeditions. As in the case of the meeting of June 13 only a small proportion of the cabinet attended, the "inner committee" consisting on this occasion of Newcastle, Robinson, Holderness, Anson and Ligonier, lieutenant-general of the Ordnance. Fox appears to have been unaware of the suspension of his orders, as he notified Newcastle the same day as the meeting (October 9) that the warrants had been signed by the king. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 63.

The Minute of the above meeting (Whitehall, October 9, 1754) is in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32995, f. 328.

<sup>66</sup> Robinson to Newcastle, October 11, 1754. *Ibid.*, 32737, f. 105.

carefully kept dark almost all of his measures. One order, which leaked out, had not been ratified by the king, and was consequently suspended by his Majesty—doubtless at Newcastle's instance.<sup>67</sup>

In all of these efforts to commit the administration to a vigorous policy, it was probably Cumberland who directed the military programme and Fox who managed cleverly the politics. That they should succeed in the end, when neither of them possessed a vote in the cabinet, is assuredly a tribute to their energy and skill. On Tuesday the 15th Fox was to consult the Duke of Cumberland,<sup>68</sup> but what plans were concerted between them are not known. We may presume that the cabinet met on the 16th<sup>69</sup>—the day fixed out of deference to Fox—but just what decision was taken we can only conjecture. Judging from a letter of Newcastle's somewhat later, we may infer that the entire scheme of Cumberland and Fox received endorsement and that all differences between Newcastle and Fox on the subject of expense<sup>70</sup> were decided in favor of the latter.<sup>71</sup> All the First Lord had been actually able to accomplish was to put effective clogs in the way of the secretary's haste, and when Fox attempted once more to hurry Pitcher, his colleagues insisted upon thwarting what they considered to be an effort to trick them.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 107. Nothing daunted, Fox hired some transports two days later without waiting for authorization from the Treasury, stating frankly that the time would not "admit of it". Fox to West, October 11, 1754. *Ibid.*, f. 133.

<sup>68</sup> Anson to Newcastle, October 12, 1754. *Ibid.*, f. 129.

<sup>69</sup> Newcastle sent Robinson to consult Cumberland, who was accordingly invited to attend the meeting; and the whole policy of the administration was probably discussed. Newcastle to Walpole, October 26, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 207.

<sup>70</sup> Fox, for example, wished six months' pay in advance to be sent to the colonial regiments, and that it should be due from September 24. Newcastle would have waited until it was certain that the regiments could be actually raised. This was an acknowledgment of the difficulty in raising troops, which had probably been the reason for Fox's proposition. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, ff. 51, 107.

<sup>71</sup> "I have differed a little", writes Newcastle later, in relating the controversy, "as to some preparatory steps, which, I thought, might be more frugally and effectually done another way. But as the Duke (Cumberland) persisted in thinking otherwise, I have, in great measure, acquiesced." Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 207.

<sup>72</sup> Pitcher came in great astonishment to Robinson and showed him a letter from Fox ordering him (Pitcher) to arrange for his departure at once. Robinson, who was an obedient follower of Newcastle's politics, ventured now to act on his own initiative, and detained the deputy-commissary while he consulted the Chancellor. Hardwicke expressed his belief that it was a scheme to get Pitcher to America long before Braddock should arrive, thus giving the colonists the impression that the government was still unprepared, and, in consequence, to discredit the ministry. Fox's letter was accordingly remodelled and Pitcher's departure deferred. Robinson to Newcastle, October 26, 1754. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 201.

It was not, in fact, until January that the two regiments of Braddock's ill-fated expedition embarked for America.<sup>73</sup>

The temporary stir which took place in Paris as a result of these preparations certainly justified the fears of Newcastle and the Chancellor;<sup>74</sup> and, after all the trouble and contention attending both expeditions, as we know, ended in failure, Braddock's being cut to pieces in the forests of Pennsylvania, and Shirley's abandoned after numerous hardships.<sup>75</sup>

But the political aspects of the controversy were scarcely less important than the military. It was in November that Fox and Pitt united to humiliate Newcastle<sup>76</sup> in Parliament, and it was in December that the duke was compelled to admit Fox to the cabinet.<sup>77</sup> The faction which forced the duke's hand in the autumn of 1754 might be called the germ of the War Party, which precipitated the rupture with France in 1755.<sup>78</sup>

THAD W. RIKER.

<sup>73</sup> The general himself embarked toward the end of December.

<sup>74</sup> See Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I. 10, 30.

<sup>75</sup> It had apparently been originally planned to send Shirley against the French settlements on the St. John (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 32737, f. 107) but he was eventually sent against Fort Niagara, which he promised Braddock to reach toward the end of June (Sargent, p. 306). The expedition against Crown Point was also unsuccessful; only the one against Ft. Beauséjour accomplished its object.

<sup>76</sup> Pitt attacked Newcastle directly; both Pitt and Fox humbled the duke's representative, Robinson; and Pitt also attacked Murray, the duke's leading debater.

<sup>77</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 34.

<sup>78</sup> The ultimate triumph of the War Party is briefly summarized in Dr. von Ruville's *Life of Chatham* (Eng. trans.), I. 355, 364-365.